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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a worker's compensation case appealed from the Idaho Industrial Commission 
(hereinafter the "Commission"). Appellant Maria Gomez (hereinafter "Gomez" or "claimant") 
appeals from the Order of the Commission dated January 31, 2011 adopting the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law of the Referee and the Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration 
dated April 7, 2011 which found that claimant failed to prove that the medical treatment she 
received after her February 16, 2010 IME performed by Dr. Simon was related to her industrial 
accident and injury. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 25, 2010 Gomez filed a Complaint alleging that she injured her low back while 
in the employ of Blackfoot Brass, also known as Dura Mark, Inc. (hereinafter "Employer" or 
"Blackfoot Brass"). R., pp. 1-2. On July 6, 2010, claimant requested an emergency hearing on 
the issue of whether she was entitled to payment of total temporary disability ("TTD") benefits 
after defendants terminated her TTD benefits based upon a February 16, 2010 determination by 
Dr. David Simon that she was medically stable and that no future medical treatment was needed. 
R., pp. 4-21. In their Answer, defendants denied that any additional benefits were owed to the 
claimant. R., pp. 22-24. The Commission held a hearing on October 6, 2010 on two issues: (1) 
whether claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by Idaho 
Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; and (2) whether claimant is entitled to temporary partial 
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and/or temporary total disability benefits, and the extent thereof. Appendix-Notice of Hearing 
filed August 3, 2010 (hereinafter "Notice of Hearing"); R., p. 58. On January 11, 2011 the 
Referee concluded that the claimant failed to prove that the medical benefits she sought were 
incurred for conditions related to her industrial accident and injury. R., p. 69. The Commission 
then issued an Order on January 31, 2011 in which they held that claimant failed to prove that 
the medical treatment she received after Dr. Simon's February 16, 2010 IME was related to her 
industrial accident and injury. R., p. 71. The claimant then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to 
Reopen the Record for the Taking of Additional Evidence on the Issue of Causation (hereinafter 
"Motion for Reconsideration"). IL pp. 73-77. On April 7, 2011 the Commission entered an 
Order Denying Reconsideration. R., pp. 85-93. Claimant timely appealed. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
l. The Claimant's Background/Pre-Injury Employment 
The claimant is a forty three year old divorced resident of Idaho with two children, ages 
twenty and nineteen. Hearing Transcript "Tr." p. 4, L.1-p. 5, L.1. She was hired by Blackfoot 
Brass in 2001 as a packing inspector responsible for cleaning parts from the sandblaster, 
inspecting them, boxing them, labeling the boxes and placing the boxes on pallets. Tr. p. 8, 11. 
22-24; p. 46, 11. 2-25. 
2. Claimant's Accident and Injury 
On July 24, 2009, the claimant injured her low back while lifting a sixty pound box 
"wrong." Tr. p. 19, 11. 8-10. She alleged that she suffered immediate pain along her beltline and 
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down her right leg. Id. at p. 19, 11. 11-21. She testified that she told her supervisor, Josh Scott, 
immediately about the pain in her back and dovm her leg. Id. at p. 19, 11. 21-24. Mr. Scott 
testified that she told him that she injured her lower back but not her right leg. Tr. p. 54. 11. 4-11. 
He also filled out an accident form indicating that the claimant only injured her low back. 
Defendants Exhibit "Def. Ex.", C. p. 17. 
After receiving notice of her accident, Mr. Scott sent Ms. Gomez to a local chiropractor, 
Dr. Johnson in Blackfoot. Tr. p. 20, 11. 4-9. Dr. Johnson then referred the claimant to Dr. 
Grimmett. Id. at p. 20, II. 22-25. Dr. Grimmett recommended an MRI based upon the claimant's 
complaints. Claimant's Exhibit "Clmt. Ex." 4, p. 49. She underwent an MRI on October 10, 
2009 and saw a neurosurgeon, Dr. Huneycutt on November 11, 2009. Clmt. Ex. 2, p. 28. Dr. 
Huneycutt reviewed the lumbar MRI scan and indicated that it showed a herniation at L4-5 with 
impingement of the exiting nerve root on the right and neural foraminal stenosis. Id. He 
diagnosed the claimant with a herniated disc with lumbar radiculopathy and low back pain 
following incident at work. Id. However, he refused to relate the claimant's disc herniation to 
her activities at work stating "I have made no statement in referencing to causality. I made it 
clear to the patient that I would defer her to a physical medicine specialist in the determination of 
causality or disability determinations." Id. Dr. Huneycutt then referred the claimant to Dr. 
Poulter for follow up care. Tr. p. 22, II. 3-6. 
On December 7, 2009 the claimant was evaluated by Dr. Poulter and an epidural steroid 
injection was recommended. Def. Ex., A, p. 3. She later underwent an epidural steroid injection 
,, - _) -
but told Dr. Simon in February 20 IO that the epidural steroid injection "did not work." 
Deposition of David C. Simon, M.D. dated November 2, 20 IO (hereinafter "Simon Depo."), p. 
14, 11. 1-4. She then underwent a course of physical therapy. Clmt. Ex. 3, pp. 30-44. 
3. Dr. Simon's February 16, 2010 Examination 
On February 16, 20 IO at the request of the State Insurance Fund (hereinafter "Fund"), the 
claimant underwent an examination by Dr. David Simon. Dr. Simon is a physician licensed to 
practice medicine in the State of Idaho specializing and board certified in physical medicine and 
rehabilitation. Simon Depo., p. 6, L. I 0-p.7, L. 10. Prior to Dr. Simon's examination, the 
claimant filled out a pain questionnaire in which she denied any previous problems or injuries to 
her low back, denied having any difficulties prior to her injury similar to those that she was 
experiencing at the time and denied any work injuries in the past. Id. at p. 12, 11. 1-24. However, 
Dr. Simon noted based upon his review of the medical records that the claimant had back pain 
and suffered industrial injuries in the past, contrary to her statements to him. Id. at p. 13, 11. 1-9. 
At the time of his examination, Dr. Simon noted that the claimant demonstrated exaggerated pain 
behaviors. Id. at p. 15, 11. 1-18. Dr. Simon performed a physical examination of the claimant 
including a negative straight leg raise which indicated that the claimant did not have a lumbar 
radiculopathy. Def. Ex. A, p. 4. 
Dr. Simon diagnosed the claimant with back and right leg pain originating from her 
accident at Blackfoot Brass and a resultant strain injury all of which had resolved. Def. Ex. A, p. 
5. He felt the claimant's physical examination was inconsistent with a disc herniation 
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radiculopathy, that she demonstrated exaggerated pain behaviors and had inconsistent findings 
on the examination. Dr. Simon opined that the claimant's subjective symptoms outweighed his 
objective findings. Def. Ex. A, p. 5. In addition to his physical exam, Dr. Simon personally 
reviewed a September 16, 2009 x-ray of the claimant's lumbar spine and the October 10, 2009 
MRI of the claimant's lumbar spine. Simon Depo., p. 17, 11. 3-8. Due to the claimant's reported 
symptoms, he was concerned that she had a pinched nerve which would be visible on the films; 
however, based upon his personal review of the claimant's MRI he did not see any evidence of a 
pinched nerve. Id. at p. 17, L. 9-p. 18, L. 3. While Dr. Simon saw evidence of a disc protrusion at 
the L4-5 level, it did not pinch any nerves or create stenosis, i.e., narrowing of the exiting nerve 
root sufficient to explain her reported symptoms. Simon Depo., p. 18, L. 24-p.19, L. 6. 
Following receipt of Dr. Simon's report in March 2010, the Idaho State Insurance Fund 
terminated the claimant's time loss, i.e., TTD benefits. R., pp.13 and 15. Thereafter, on April 8, 
2010 Dr. Poulter indicated that he disagreed with Dr. Simon's findings and opined that the 
claimant had a persistent disc bulge which continued to be symptomatic and required additional 
treatment. IL p. 7. Dr. Poulter stated that on the claimant's MRI "she had an acute L4-5 disc 
rupture with right neuroforaminal stenosis and contact with the exiting nerve root at this level." 
Id. He recommended additional treatment, including an epidural steroid injection and possible 
surgical intervention. Id. On April 22, 2010 Dr. Poulter restricted Ms. Gomez from returning to 
work until her treatment was completed and she was feeling better. R., p. 11. 
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Shortly thereafter, by letter dated April 27, 2010, Dr. Simon addressed Dr. Poulter's 
concerns. R., p. 38; Def. Ex. A, pp. 8-9. As Dr. Simon indicated, their difference of opinion was 
related to their different understanding of what the MRI showed. Id. at p. 8. Dr. Simon took 
issue with Dr. Poulter's conclusion that the MRI showed an "acute" L4-5 disc rupture. Id. He 
also disagreed with Dr. Poulter's conclusion that the MRI showed stenosis or a disc in contact 
with the exiting nerve root. Dr. Simon reiterated that he did not appreciate any stenosis on the 
MRI and cited the radiologist's report that at L4-5 "the neural foramen are widely patent" which 
supported his conclusion that there was no contact with the exiting nerve root to justify the 
claimant's symptoms. Id. Further, Dr. Simon opined that the claimant's reported symptoms 
were not localized to an LS distribution; therefore the most likely explanation was that her 
reported right leg symptoms were not legitimate. Simon Depo., p. 21, 11. 5-11; Def. Ex. A, p. 9. 
Based upon his examination in which the claimant's subjective symptoms outweighed his 
objective findings, her lack of credibility as a historian, and the lack of any anatomical 
explanation for the claimant's purported right leg symptoms on the MRI, Dr. Simon opined there 
was no causal relationship between her continuing complaints and her industrial accident and 
injury of July 24, 2009. Simon Depo., p. 23, 11. 10-14. Dr. Simon further opined that (I) the 
claimant had reached maximum medical improvement, (2) no further medical treatment was 
necessary and (3) she could return to work without restrictions. Id. at p. 24, 11. 3-12. Most 
importantly, Dr. Simon noted because there was no anatomical explanation for her right leg pain, 
there was no medical treatment that was reasonable and necessary to treat the pain. Id., p. 24, 11. 
13-16. Dr. Simon indicated that any further epidural steroid injections or physical therapy was 
not medically necessary. Id. at p. 29, 11. 4-11. 
- 6 -
4. Claimant's Medical Care After February 16, 2010 
Fallowing Dr. Simon's full release of the claimant to return to work in May 2010, Gomez 
was offered a light duty position at Blackfoot Brass. Def. Ex. C, p. 95. Mr. Scott offered the 
claimant an opportunity to return to work because she indicated that she needed light duty work 
and was interested in returning to work. However, Mr. Scott imposed three stipulations on her 
return: no heavy lifting, no more than three absences and only a four hour work day. Id. Mr. 
Scott testified that he talked to Dr. Poulter who recommended that the claimant return to light 
duty work with less than a full day of work at the time of his offer. Tr., p. 60, 11. 1-9. 
Following the termination of her TTD or income benefits, Gomez continued to treat with 
Dr. Poulter numerous times through September 2010. See generally, Clmt. Ex. 1. At hearing, 
claimant's counsel submitted Dr. Poulter's denied medical bills for treatment rendered to Gomez 
as an exhibit into the record. Claimant's Supplement-Pre-Hearing Disclosure of Witnesses and 
Exhibits, Clmt. Ex. 7. According to Dr. Poulter's medical records, the Fund stopped paying her 
medical bills in August 2010. Id. As a result Gomez owed an outstanding balance as of the 
hearing of $1,282.00 for which she sought payment from the Fund. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Claimant Had Ample Notice That She Would Have to Prove That the 
Medical Treatment for Which She Sought Benefits at Hearing Was Causally Related to 
Her Industrial Accident and Injury; Therefore the Commission Properly Denied Her 
Motion for Reconsideration and Her Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated 
The gravamen of claimant's argument on appeal is that she was not given notice by the 
Commission that she was required to prove a causal relationship between her medical treatment 
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and her industrial accident at hearing. However, an examination of the Notice of Hearing and 
Idaho law clearly establishes that she was given proper notice that she would be required to 
establish a causal relationship between her industrial accident and the medical treatment for 
which she sought workers' compensation benefits. 
l. Under Idaho Code § 72-432, Claimant has the Initial Burden of 
Establishing That her Medical Expenses Were Incurred as a Result ofan 
Industrial Accident. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Commission correctly noted that 
under Idaho law "Claimant bears the burden of proving that medical expenses and 
treatment were incurred as a result of an industrial injury and must provide medical 
testimony that supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability." 
R., p. 63 ( citing Langley v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 
732 (1995) ( emphasis in original). Consistent with Idaho Supreme Court precedent in 
Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 130 P.3d 1097 (2006), the Commission stated 
that Claimant "must first show that there is a causal relationship between the accident and the 
injuries for which she claims benefits .... She must show it is more likely than not that her need 
for treatment is causally related to the subject accident." R., p. 63. As this Court stated in 
Henderson, "one of the facts essential to the recovery of medical expenses is that the expenses 
were incurred as a result of an industrial accident." Henderson, 142 Idaho at 563, 130 P.3d at 
1101. Otherwise, workers' compensation insurance becomes health insurance and would cover 
every ailment that a claimant suffers following an industrial accident regardless of whether the 
- 8 -
treatment was related to their industrial accident. "Worker's compensation is not meant or 
intended to be life or health insurance; it is purely accident and occupational disease insurance." 
Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477,479, 95 P.3d 628, 630 (2004). 
As a result, it is well-settled under Idaho law that an employee, such as Gomez, "seeking 
compensation for medical care must prove that there is a causal relationship between the 
industrial accident and a need for medical care." Henderson, 142 Idaho 559, 564, 130 P.3d 
1097, 1102. Defendants stopped paying Gomez's medical bills based on Dr. Simon's February 
2010 and April 27, 2010 opinions that there was no causal relationship between her continuing 
pain complaints and her industrial accident. It is very clear to the parties that there was a dispute 
between Dr. Pautler and Dr. Simon as to the cause of claimant's complaints and whether 
additional medical treatment was required or related to her industrial injuries. Therefore, the 
primary issue decided at the hearing before the Commission was "whether the Claimant is 
entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432 and 
the extent thereof." Notice of Hearing (emphasis added). Since claimant was seeking payment 
of Dr. Poulter's unpaid medical bills it should have been clear to her that she had the burden of 
. . 1 
provmg causat10n. 
In her post-hearing brief, claimant apparently believed that she was only required to 
establish that Dr. Poulter' s denied medical expenses were reasonable. In her Opening Brief after 
hearing, claimant mistakenly cited the primary issue as "whether claimant's medical treatment 
1 
Gomez offered medical reports at hearing which related her medical treatment to her accident, but the Commission 
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after February 16, 2010 was reasonable." Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 2. However, the actual 
issue noticed by the Commission went far beyond the limited issue of reasonableness - it 
included "whether the claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medial care as provided 
by Idaho Code § 72-4 3 2 and the extent thereof." Notice of Hearing. 
Claimant's misunderstanding of her well-settled burden under Idaho law is evidenced by 
her argument to this Court that under Idaho Code § 72-432, once a claim is accepted and 
treatment is paid by the surety, all treatment provided by the treating doctor is presumed to be 
causally related to the industrial accident. Appellate's Brief, p. 9. Under claimant's argument --
which is contrary to Supreme Court precedent in Henderson and F(fe v. Home Depot, Inc., ISCR 
No. 37894 (September 2, 2011) -- the only inquiry the Commission can make is into the 
reasonableness of the medical treatment, not its necessity or whether it is causally related to the 
industrial accident. Claimant's argument transforms workers' compensation insurance into health 
insurance, because medical treatment rendered by the claimant's physician can only be 
challenged on the basis of whether it is reasonable, regardless of whether it is related to the 
industrial injury. 
The fallacy of claimant's argument was recently addressed by this Court in F[fe which is 
strikingly similar to the instant case. In F[fe, the Court reiterated that a claimant seeking the 
payment of medical benefits under Idaho Code § 72-432 must first establish causation before the 
Commission addresses the reasonableness of the medical treatment. Fife, ISCR No. 3 7894. In 
chose to accept Defendants' expert's opinions on the issue. 
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Fife, the claimant injured his low back while at work. Three weeks later, he underwent a five 
level decompression and fusion surgery. Thereafter, the surety requested claimant's medical 
records and had them reviewed by a physician who performed an independent medical 
examination. As is the case here, in Fife the IME physician concluded claimant's need for 
surgery was not related to his industrial accident as his MRI did not show any evidence of acute 
injury, fracture or dislocation consistent with an industrial accident or injury. 
In Fife following an evidentiary hearing and post hearing depositions, the Commission 
accepted the testimony of the IME physician and concluded that the claimant failed to prove that 
the medical condition for which he had surgery was causally related to his industrial accident or 
that his accident aggravated his pre-existing degenerative condition. On appeal Fife argued that 
the surgery was reasonable treatment for his industrial accident. As with Gomez, in support of 
his argument the claimant in Fife relied on Idaho Code § 72-432 and this Court's decision in 
Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., in which it held that "it is for the physician, not the 
Commission, to decide whether the treatment is required." Sprague, 116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 
P.2d 395, 397 (1989). 
However, this Court dismissed Fife's argument stating that "a determination that a 
particular treatment was required for a claimant's medical condition does not equate to a 
determination that the employer or surety is liable for the cost of that treatment." Fife, ISCR No. 
37894. In Fife, as in the present case, the Commission held that the claimant failed to prove that 
the industrial accident caused the condition for which the claimant sought medical treatment. 
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The Commission did not question the reasonableness of the surgery as a treatment for his 
medical condition, because as with Gomez, the claimant failed to establish causation. 
Ultimately, the Court upheld the Commission's determination that the claimant failed to prove 
causation because it was supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. 
While not breaking new ground, the decision in Fzfe simply stands for the well 
established proposition that the claimant always bears the initial burden of proving that medical 
treatment was caused by an industrial accident. Once claimant establishes that the medical 
treatment is causally related to her industrial accident, she then bears the burden of proving that 
it is reasonable. It is precisely this initial burden the Commission held that claimant failed to 
carry at hearing. R., p. 71. 
2. Claimant Received Adequate Notice That She Would Have to Prove That 
Her Medical Treatment Which Was Denied by the Surety was Caused by 
Her Industrial Accident. 
The Notice of Hearing unequivocally stated that the primary issue to be determined was 
whether "the claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by 
Idaho Code § 72-432 and the extent thereof." Notice of Hearing. At the time of the hearing, the 
Fund denied payment of claimant's medical bills incurred after July 2010 and also terminated her 
TTD benefits based upon Dr. Simon's determination February 2010 that she was medically 
stable. At hearing claimant claimed that she was entitled to additional medical care as evidenced 
by the inclusion of her medical records and medical bills incurred after Dr. Simon's February 16, 
2010 examination into evidence. 
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In her Brief, Gomez claims that she felt "ambushed by [the Commission's] decision as 
she did not secure or submit evidence on causation, such as the deposition testimony of Dr. 
Poulter and Dr. Huneycutt who would testify that Claimant suffered from a herniated disc related 
to her work injury." Appellate's Brief, p. 6. First, claimant could not feel "ambushed" by the 
Commission as it is well settled precedent in Idaho that she is required to establish causation, 
especially when the Fund denied claimant's medical bills based upon a physician's opinion that 
the claimant's medical treatment was not causally related to her industrial accident. Second, the 
claimant submitted evidence of causation to the Commission, including Dr. Poulter's and Dr. 
Huneycutt's records which obviated the need for live testimony. A claimant can establish 
medical causation to a reasonable degree of probability based solely upon her medical records 
which constitute "medical testimony." Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 997 P .2d 621 
(2000). The claimant presented "testimony" in the form of her medical records, including Dr. 
Poulter's and Dr. Honeycutt's medical records in which they both stated that they believed the 
MRI showed a disc herniation which caused impingement on the exiting nerve root. Clmt. Ex. 
2, p. 29; Clmt. Ex. 1, p. 2. Ultimately, the Commission rejected the opinions of Drs. Poulter and 
and Honeycutt, instead adopting the opinions of Drs. Simon, Montalbano and Biddulph (the 
radiologist who interpreted the original MRI) that there was no radiologic evidence that her disc 
was impinging on her exiting nerve root, thus there was no anatomic explanation for her 
symptoms and no further medical treatment was necessary to treat her industrial injury. R., p. 
68. 
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Finally, and most importantly, the claimant put causation at issue because she made a 
claim for the payment of additional medical benefits following Dr. Simon's February 16, 2010 
examination. As the Commission noted in its Notice of Hearing, the issue was not simply 
whether the claimant's medical treatment was reasonable; rather it was whether the claimant was 
entitled to additional medical treatment ("the extent thereof') and whether the medical treatment 
was reasonable and necessary under Idaho Code § 72-432. 
Despite making causation an issue by requesting payment of denied medical bills and 
TTD benefits at issue, in her Brief the claimant attempted to differentiate her case from 
Henderson. The claimant placed great importance upon the fact that this was her first hearing 
before the Commission hearing, while the claimant in Henderson had one prior hearing. This 
distinction makes no difference because in Henderson, at the first hearing the Commission 
determined that the claimant's injury to her neck exacerbated a pre-existing condition. 
Henderson, 130 P.3d at 1100. At the second hearing the issue was the same as it was in Gomez, 
namely whether the claimant's medical treatment, i.e., her neck surgery, was causally related to 
her industrial accident. Id. Ultimately the Commission held that she was not entitled to medical 
benefits for the surgery. Id. 
On appeal the claimant in Henderson argued that she did not have notice that she would 
have to prove at the second hearing that her neck surgery was causally connected to her 
industrial accident. Id. The Supreme Court analyzed whether the claimant had notice that she 
would have to prove causation at her second hearing. Id. The fact that she had a prior hearing 
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determining the initial compensability of her injury was of no significance in the court's analysis. 
Rather, the court analyzed long standing precedent which "made it clear that an employee 
seeking compensation for medical care must prove that there is a causal relationship between the 
industrial accident and the need for the medical care." Id. at p. 1102. Since the issue to be heard 
at the second hearing in Henderson was whether the claimant was entitled to additional medical 
benefits, as it was in Gomez, the claimant was required to prove a causal connection in order to 
receive these additional medical benefits. Id. As with Gomez, the claimant in Henderson "put 
causation at issue by virtue of her claim for additional medical benefits." Id. Therefore, the 
court specifically held that "she was not denied due process by the Referee's failure to expressly 
state that causation was one of the facts Claimant must prove in order to recover those medical 
benefits." Id. (citing Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 118 P.3d 111 (2005)). 
3. The Claimant Was Not Denied Her Constitutional Rights to Due Process. 
As the Henderson case illustrates where, as here, the claimant places her entitlement to 
additional medical benefits at issue, the Commission's failure to specifically identify that 
causation was one of the facts which claimant must prove in order to recover those medical 
benefits does not deny the claimant her due process rights. Henderson, 130 P.3d at 1102. Under 
Idaho law, an administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the affected party 
with fair notice and providing them with a full opportunity to be heard on the issue. White v. 
Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977). Idaho Code § 72-713 
codifies this rule and requires the Commission to provide the parties with written notice of the 
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issues to be heard ten (10) days prior to hearing. Idaho Code§ 72-713. In Hernandez, cited by 
the claimant, the Referee in the Notice of Hearing indicated that one of the issues to be decided 
at hearing included "whether and to what extent, Hernandez was entitled to medical benefits, 
including cervical spine surgery." Hernandez, 141 Idaho at 781, 118 P.3d at 113 (emphasis 
added). The issue to be decided at hearing in Hernandez is virtually identical to the issue in the 
Notice of Hearing in the instant case. However, in Hernandez, the claimant argued not that he 
had no notice that causation was an issue, but that he did not have proper notice of the 
Commission's finding that he had reached maximum medical improvement and thus was only 
entitled to benefits through that date. Id. While the Notice of Hearing did not reference to 
specific issue, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the issue of maximum medical improvement 
was necessarily an issue by virtue of claimant's claim for additional temporary income benefits. 
Id. As in Hernandez and Henderson, in this case medical causation was necessarily an issue at 
hearing because of Gomez's claim for additional medical and TTD benefits, so claimant's due 
process rights were not violated. 
Gomez bases her argument that her constitutional rights were violated on the White case, 
arguing that the precise issue of causation was not contained in the Commission's Notice of 
Hearing. However, White offers no support for her position. Instead, White stands for the 
proposition that due process may be violated by the Commission deciding an issue about which a 
party to the action had no notice: 
Idaho case law ... is equally insistent that an administrative tribunal 
may not raise issues without first serving the affected party with 
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fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet the 
issue. The order of the Industrial Commission, because it rests 
upon an issue of which the claimant had no fair notice, violates the 
due process requirements of this State's Constitution ... and must be 
reversed. 
White, 98 Idaho at 786, 572 P.2d at 889 (citations omitted). Herc Ms. Gomez had notice that her 
entitlement to medical benefits was at issue and, was given an opportunity to present evidence on 
this issue, including causation, and she presented causation evidence. 
The Commission gave fair notice to the claimant that her entitlement to medical benefits, 
including the extent thereof, was at issue. The notice which informed the parties that the purpose 
of the hearing was to determine amount of benefits claimant was entitled to complied with due 
process requirements. Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 847, 840 P.2d 383, 391 
(1992); McGee v. JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 334, 17 P.3d 272, 278 (2000) (finding notice that 
referenced liability was an issue did not violate due process rights even though it did not identify 
specifically that medical stability would be an issue). Once Gomez received this notice she 
should have known that, based upon prior Supreme Court precedent in Henderson (and 
reconfirmed recently in Fife) she carried the burden of proving that additional medical treatment 
was causally related to her industrial accident. Although she presented evidence on this issue, 
the Commission rejected it and held that she failed to meet her burden of proof. Clearly, the 
claimant was not denied her due process rights. 
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B. The Commission's Finding That Claimant Failed to Meet Her Burden of 
Proving That Her Medical Treatment She Received After February 16, 2010 is Related to 
Her Industrial Accident and Injury is Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence 
When the Supreme Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it reviews 
questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the 
Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). 
Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund (In re Wilson), 128 
Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). "As the factfinder, the Commission is free to 
determine the weight to be given to the testimony of physicians. The Commission is not bound 
to accept the opinion of the treating physician over that of a physician who merely examined the 
claimant for the pending litigation." Gooby v. Lake Shore Mgmt. Co., 136 Idaho 79, 86, 29 P.3d 
390, 397 (2001). The Supreme Court will not disturb the Commission's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 4 75 
(2000). Finally, all facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
Respondents herein as they prevailed before the Industrial Commission. Parker v. Engle, 115 
Idaho 860, 863, 771 P.2d 524, 528 (1989). 
In this case the Commission was asked to resolve a dispute between Drs. Poulter and 
Honeycutt, on the one hand, and Drs. Simon, Montalbano and Biddulph on the other as to 
whether claimant's lumbar MRI demonstrated impingement which would explain her continuing 
pain complaints and justify the medical expenses incurred to treat those complaints. In its 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Referee did an excellent job outlining the 
conflicting opinions of the physicians. R., p. 68. The Commission then resolved this conflict in 
favor of the Defendants stating: 
R., pp. 68-69. 
In resolving this conflict, the Referee is more persuaded by the 
opinions expressed by Drs. Simon, Montalbano and Biddulph, than 
those of Drs. Poulter and Honeycutt, regarding the etiology of the 
condition which required Claimant to receive on-going treatment 
from Dr. Poulter following Dr. Simon's February 16, 2009, IME. 
Dr. Poulter's treatment both before and after Dr. Simon's IME was 
ostensibly directed at Claimant's L4-L5 nerve root and alleged 
right leg radiculopathy. However, the MRI report itself is clear 
that there is no nerve root impingement at that level, and is so read 
by Drs. Simon and Montalbano, as well as the radiologist. While 
Dr. Poulter may well have also been treating some myofascial pain 
and whatever pain may have arisen from the annular fibrosis tear at 
L5-S 1, there is nothing in the record in that regard. Further, the 
record does not reveal the bases for Drs. Huneycutt's or Poulter's 
reading of the MRI in the manner they do. 
Therefore, there is substantial evidence in the form of medical opinions from Drs. Simon, 
Montalbano and Biddulph that the claimant's continuing complaints and the medical treatment 
incurred to treat those complaints was not causally related to her industrial accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission gave proper notice to the parties that a determination of the claimant's 
entitlement to additional medical benefits (which were denied on the basis of lack of causation) 
would be determined at hearing. It is well settled under Idaho law that in order to recover 
additional medical benefits, claimant was required to establish causation. Therefore, under 
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Supreme Court precedent in Henderson, Hernandez and Fife, claimant was not denied her due 
process rights by the Commission's failure to specifically identify causation as an issue to be 
decided at hearing. In fact, claimant provided evidence of causation at hearing by several reports 
from Drs. Poulter and Honeycutt which she believed established that her medical treatment was 
related to her industrial accident. As a result, the Commission's denial of her Motion for 
Reconsideration should not be overturned by this Court. 
The Commission, however, after weighing the evidence, decided that the evidence 
provided by Defendants was more persuasive and thus determined that the claimant failed to 
meet her burden of establishing that her medical treatment was related to her industrial accident. 
The Commission's decision was supported by sufficient and competent evidence and should not 
be overturned on appeal. 
t} 
Dated thisl-3 day of September, 2011. 
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